The first version of this diary, Surviving and resisting fascism reading list: proposals for organized opposition in Trump's America, begins with some basic premises, outlined in diaries I’ve written since the election:
1) the fascist nature of Trump’s candidacy, 2) how Trump voters and supporters are best understood as proto-fascists, and 3) how conservatism is the ideological precursor to fascism, described in detail here, here, here, here and here.
My goal is to encourage, and participate in, the development of coordinated resistance to the emerging fascist political order in the US at the local, state and federal levels.
As a starting point, I proposed the creation of a social media campaign, and the use of internet based resources to target fascists and expressions of fascism wherever they appear, in my diary:
Use the weapons of the enemy: creating a social media campaign to fight fascists.
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As I continue to review articles and books about fascism, authoritarian/dictatorial governments, and opposition movements around the world, and share them with this community, my view remains that the election of Trump reflects the ascendance of a fascist order in the US, and this contemporary fascism arises directly out of right-wing ideology.
The right-wing globally-- even in its mildest guises (for example, 'movement conservatism' here in the US) is always essentially anti-democratic, and opposed to inclusive pluralism; the distinctions between parties and regimes in various nations are inconsequential in comparison to these common features.
In contrast, I say that a progressive model of American democracy necessarily is one that is inclusive, pluralistic, whose primary purpose is to provide equal protection of the law, equal justice, and equal educational and economic opportunity.
The US has never attained this progressive ideal, but to the extent that it has moved closer to it in the past century, it is with and through the efforts of the Democratic party. The GOP has systematically opposed the extension of rights and economic opportunity, and attempted to curtail the civil liberties of anyone not white, male, heterosexual and Christian in that time.
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Historically, right-wing and left-wing authoritarian regimes could be distinguished to some degree by the merging of the state apparatus with business interests— Soviet Russia, Communist China and Cuba are the primary examples of left-wing authoritarian regimes that made business enterprises state enterprises-- but this distinction no longer appears meaningful in the 21st century. Central state control of business interests has diminished in each of these countries, while political control remains absolute in the hands of leadership (Putin in Russia, Raul Castro in Cuba, the Central Party Committee in China).
In this way, it is now increasingly difficult to distinguish the model of governance in Cuba from that in Qatar, or China from Singapore and Egypt. Greater ability to engage in business enterprises, perhaps, with primary benefit to the ruling class, but with little or no attention given to civil liberties.
Few modern authoritarian regimes fit the definition of fascist. However, it is useful to look to those who have lived under authoritarian governments, and those who study them, to learn how we may resist the rising tide of fascism in the US, embodied in the GOP at the state and federal levels.
A relatively recent conceptualization of modern authoritarian regimes is that of ‘hybrid’ or ‘competitive authoritarian’ regimes. This is described by Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way in their article The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism:
In recent years, many scholars have pointed to the importance of hybrid regimes. Indeed, recent academic writings have produced a variety of labels for mixed cases, including not only “hybrid regime” but also “semidemocracy,”“virtual democracy,”“electoral democracy,”“pseudodemocracy,”“illiberal democracy,”“semi-authoritarianism,”“soft authoritarianism,”“electoral authoritarianism,” and Freedom House’s “Partly Free.”1…
This article examines one particular type of “hybrid” regime: competitive authoritarianism. In competitive authoritarian regimes, formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents violate those rules so often and to such an extent, however, that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy. (pp. 51-2, emphasis added)
One does not have to stretch too far to see that the GOP fits this definition of a hybrid, competitive authoritarian regime.
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There are some questions that naturally come up when thinking about authoritarian regimes, and building a resistance movement from within:
Almost one-half of the world’s countries can be considered to be democracies, but, in our index, the number of “full democracies” is low, at only 20 countries; 59 countries are rated as “flawed democracies”. Of the remaining 88 countries in our index, 51 are “authoritarian” and 37 are considered to be “hybrid regimes”. As could be expected, the developed OECD countries dominate among “full democracies”; there are two Asian countries, one Latin American country (Uruguay) and one African country (Mauritius), which suggests that level of development is not a binding constraint, but is a constraint, nevertheless. Slightly less than one-half (48.4%) of the world’s population lives in a democracy of some sort, although only 8.9% reside in “full democracies”.
The primary mechanism facilitating Venezuela’s increasing authoritarianism could be termed “autocratic legalism.” Autocratic legalism has three key elements: the use, abuse, and non-use (in Spanish, desuso) of the law in service of the executive branch.Let us begin with the use of autocratic laws. Since it first came to power, the ruling party has taken advantage of its dominance in the country’s legislative bodies (the 1999 Constituent Assembly, the 1999–2000 “small congress” or congresillo, and the 2000–present national legislature), in conjunction with its total control of the Supreme Court since 2005, to enact laws that empower the executive branch at the expense of other branches of government. (pg. 38)The second element of autocratic legalism is the abuse of the law, meaning the inconsistent and biased implementation of laws and regulations… this has occurred in many domains, but is especially salient in the media world, and it helps to explain how, under Chávez, the balance between private independent media and government-controlled media shifted in favor of the latter. Today, an ordinary Venezuelan with little access to the Internet is more likely to be exposed to public or proPSUV media, which is usually more easily available and economically accessible than private independent media. The consequence has been a significant decline in press pluralism. This shift in the media, known locally as “communicational hegemony,” has been a deliberate strategy of chavismo. 1 (pg. 40)The third element of autocratic legalism is, paradoxically, reliance on illegality. This has been especially significant in electoral politics. One of Chávez’s most important authoritarian legacies is an electoral environment plagued by irregularities and governed by a biased regulatory agency, the National Electoral Council (CNE). (pg. 43)This irregularity-prone electoral environment has only deteriorated since Chávez’s death in March 2013, beginning with the election for his successor the following month. In that contest, Maduro, who was then acting president, prevailed over his opponent, Henrique Capriles Radonski, by a mere 235,000 votes (a 1.5 percent margin). The opposition claimed that, in the run-up to the election and on election day itself, there were repeated and new irregularities (for example, PSUV sympathizers were seen escorting voters to polls under the pretense of assisting them; harassing electoral observers and voters; paying citizens to bring people to the polls; and maybe even engaging in fraud at a few polling centers), which gave Maduro his narrow victory… . The opposition called for a full audit, which was refused (although the CNE did conduct an audit of the electronic tallies versus the paper ballots), and then—for the first time since 2005—the opposition challenged the election, formally calling for the election either to be annulled or done over in roughly 5,700 voting tables (in Venezuela, each voting table or mesa electoral is associated with a particular touchscreen voting machine). (pg. 43)
In Europe and the United States, a polarizing us-versus-them rhetoric has moved from the political fringe to the mainstream. Blatant Islamophobia and shameless demonizing of refugees have become the currency of an increasingly assertive politics of intolerance. These trends threatened human rights in two ways, one well known, the other less visible. The high-profile threat is a rollback of rights by many governments in the face of the refugee flow and the parallel decision by the self-declared Islamic State, or ISIS, to spread its attacks beyond the Middle East. The less visible threat is the effort by a growing number of authoritarian governments to restrict civil society, particularly the civic groups that monitor and speak out about those governments’ conduct. The Western governments threatening to curtail rights include many of the strongest traditional allies of the human rights cause. Their voices are needed to counter the broader effort in countries throughout the world to squeeze civil society, jeopardizing human rights and efforts to uphold them. (pg. 1, emphasis added)
Although the extreme right in Europe displays a set of common features, in many respects its component movements diverge markedly from one another. Considering the search for counter-strategies and the most precisely-tailored approaches, it seems especially necessary to analyze those differences with great care. In the former Soviet sphe re of infl uence, nationalism and desires for ethnic homogeneity simmered for decades beneath the surface of the East bloc’s offi cial internationalist and antifascist posture. Indeed, to some extent they served as an unacknowledged legitimation for the communist regimes there. Once the upheavals of 1989 and 1990 put an end to those regimes, nationalist and xenophobic sentiments began to reassert themselves even more forcefully. They were directed especially against the Sinti and Roma, but also against national minorities, Jews, and homosexuals. Nevertheless, Eastern and Central Europe hardly have a monopoly on right-wing extremism. In Western Europe most frequently, Muslim immigrants today encounter negative stereotyping, discrimination and rejection, a tendency that right-wing populist forces increasingly are trying to exploit. (pp. 6-7, emphasis added)
The explicit connection to the focus of Trump on ‘banning all Muslims’ is evident; it is equally important to see the importance of right-wing movements as inherently ‘populist’, and it is out of populism rooted in ethno-nationalism that fascism arises:
Right-wing radicalism and racist violence appear to be highest in Protestant countries, Norway serving as a case in point. From this observation, we can infer that the current radical right is strong where it couples an ultranationalist or racist message with Islamophobia, especially in countries with long traditions of Christian mono-confessionalism. The fact that large portions of the public in Western European countries display Islamophobic attitudes and reject multiculturalism provides an opening for the radical right, enabling it to appear more mainstream in comparison to blatantly extremist discourses like anti-Semitism and biological racism. (pg. 23)
A chilling description of the infection of law enforcement and government bodies with fascists in Germany might be applied to local police departments across the US, and sounds uncannily like what has been revealed about the New York FBI office:
Although there already have been studies on racism among German police officers, the research on right-wing extremism has only just begun to examine the investigative and security authorities as players in the right-wing scene and their potential roles in permitting the spread of farright no-go zones and hegemonies. Apparently, racist prejudices and agenda-setting within the law enforcement community can prevent far right acts of violence from being recognized, strengthen far-right interpretations of the world in public debates, and ultimately contribute to the spread of extremism at the local level.70 It remains unclear why the authorities did not investigate right-wing circles for the perpetrators of the NSU murders and attacks; why concrete evidence of the far-right terror network was ignored; and why existing knowledge of far-right terrorism in Germany and abroad was not shared with politicians and the public.71 The parliamentary review of the failure of the security services revealed the existence of a complex set of links between those authorities and elements of the far right… (pg. 63, emphasis added)
We also can see the blending of ethno-nationalism with religious affiliation in the extreme right-wing in Poland, in much the way the GOP co-opted fundamentalist Christians by becoming the ‘family values’ party:
The extreme right in Poland includes radical nationalist groups that subscribe to a strongly anti-pluralist, homogeneous vision of the national community and reject basic democratic values. Violence often accompanies extreme-right politics, either directly or implicitly. The “Brown Book,” published by the “Never Again” association, documented over 600 cases of hate crimes and hate speech in the period of 2011 – 2012. In Poland, the majority of the victims of right-wing extremist violence do not belong to ethnic minorities, but rather include political opponents, homosexuals, members of smaller religious groups, and the like. Nationalist ideology here is often based on a belief that “Poles are Catholic” and its accompanying assumption that members of ethnic and religious minorities cannot be truly “Polish.” The founding father of modern Polish nationalism, Roman Dmowski, famously argued in his 1927 book, “The Church, the Nation, and the State,” that “Catholicism is not an addition to Polishness, coloring it in some way, but is a part of its essence; in large measure it defi nes its essence. Any attempt to separate Catholicism from Polishness, to separate the nation from religion and from the Church, threatens to destroy the nation’s very essence.”3 (pp. 157-8)
Here we see the merging of ideology with individual and cultural identity that is a hallmark of fascism— to oppose any aspect (for example, promoting a secular state that supports religious diversity and tolerance) is perceived by the individual as a threat to their way of life, and ultimately, themselves. (Note the conservative narrative in the US of the ‘war on Christmas’, and Christian’s as oppressed minorities.)
Finally, the experience in Austria can help us provide context to the importance of information outlets such as Breitbart and Stromfront:
Since the 1970s, the neo-Nazi, racist, and aggressively anti-Semitic press had become more prominent. Examples include the newspaper Sieg by Walter Ochensberger from Vorarlberg and the initially mainly anti-immigrant newspaper Halt by Gerd Honsik, a neo-Nazi activist who had been operating since the 1960s. Ochensberger’s associations, such as the Bund Volkstreuer Jugend (Association of Youth Loyal to the People), were prosecuted under the laws on associations.24 In the 1980s, both Ochensberger and Honsik turned to Holocaust denial. Halt mainly tried to influence the thinking of young people, especially schoolchildren. In a number of cases the publication was sent to teachers and distributed outside Viennese schools. In response, school administrators called upon historians and living witnesses to produce informational brochures to counter the distortions disseminated in Halt.25 Similarly, at Vienna University a neo-Nazi student group known as the Aktion Neue Rechte (Action for the New Right) was established, and when the organization had little success in elections to the student’s parliament, its members responded by committing violent acts. (pg.290)
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As we consider the dominance of authoritarian, hybrid-authoritarian and flawed democracies in the forms of government that 90% of the world live under, and the re-emergence as fascism as a mainstream political force, we need to be clear that the tide of history has not moved inevitably towards greater democratic norms and institutions, globally, or in the US. Thomas Carothers makes this point in the Journal of Democracy, in an article entitled The End of the Transition Paradigm:
Five core assumptions define the transition paradigm. The first, which is an umbrella for all the others, is that any country moving away from dictatorial rule can be considered a country in transition toward democracy. Especially in the first half of the 1990s, when political change accelerated in many regions, numerous policy makers and aid practitioners reflexively labeled any formerly authoritarian country that was attempting some political liberalization as a “transitional country.” (pg. 6)
The second assumption is that democratization tends to unfold in a set sequence of stages. First there occurs the opening, a period of democratic ferment and political liberalization in which cracks appear in the ruling dictatorial regime, with the most prominent fault line being that between hardliners and softliners. There follows the breakthrough— the collapse of the regime and the rapid emergence of a new, democratic system, with the coming to power of a new government through national elections and the establishment of a democratic institutional structure, often through the promulgation of a new constitution. After the transition comes consolidation, a slow but purposeful process in which democratic forms are transformed into democratic substance through the reform of state institutions, the regularization of elections, the strengthening of civil society, and the overall habituation of the society to the new democratic “rules of the game.”5 (pg. 7)
Related to the idea of a core sequence of democratization is the third assumption—the belief in the determinative importance of elections. (pg. 7)
A fourth assumption is that the underlying conditions in transitional countries—their economic level, political history, institutional legacies, ethnic make-up, sociocultural traditions, or other “structural” features— will not be major factors in either the onset or the outcome of the transition process… All that seemed to be necessary for democratization was a decision by a country’s political elites to move toward democracy and an ability on the part of those elites to fend off the contrary actions of remaining antidemocratic forces. (pg. 8)
Fifth, the transition paradigm rests on the assumption that the democratic transitions making up the third wave are being built on coherent, functioning states. The process of democratization is assumed to include some redesign of state institutions—such as the creation of new electoral institutions, parliamentary reform, and judicial reform— but as a modification of already functioning states.8 (pg. 8)
Taken together, the political trajectories of most third-wave countries call into serious doubt the transition paradigm. (pg. 14)
It is time for the democracy-promotion community to discard the transition paradigm. Analyzing the record of experience in the many countries that democracy activists have been labeling “transitional countries,” it is evident that it is no longer appropriate to assume:
• that most of these countries are actually in a transition to democracy;
• that countries moving away from authoritarianism tend to follow a three-part process of democratization consisting of opening, breakthrough, and consolidation;
• that the establishment of regular, genuine elections will not only give new governments democratic legitimacy but foster a longer term deepening of democratic participation and accountability;
• that a country’s chances for successfully democratizing depend primarily on the political intentions and actions of its political elites without significant influence from underlying economic, social, and institutional conditions and legacies;
• that state-building is a secondary challenge to democracy-building and largely compatible with it. (pg. 18, emphasis added)
I think we should at this point, looking at the presumably ‘stable, entrenched democracies’ of the US, UK and Northern Europe, question whether relying on the assumption of a ‘foundation of democratic norms and civil liberties’ can be relied upon. The last year, with Brexit, the elections of right-wing extremists throughout Europe, and of course Trump, tell us democracy remains fragile and tenuous in the places it has been believed most robust.
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Something that we see in public polling with some regularity is that progressive programs and ideas— when not identified with the Democratic party, or ‘liberals’, are overwhelmingly popular. Yet this does not consistently translate into electoral victories, nor does it influence the policies and programs enacted by the GOP. For example, most Republican voters, including the majority of NRA members, support restrictions of gun ownership, but the GOP fights every attempt at regulating firearms, at every level). Why wouldn’t the preferences of the majority of their own voters, let alone the country, have any impact? To say it’s the influence of the NRA, while not incorrect, is not the complete picture. Vladimir Gelman, discussing political opposition in Russia in his article Political Opposition in Russia: A Dying Species? highlights the limits of popular opinion in determining the actions of the authoritarian government:
...research has shown that both political regimes and party systems are often autonomous of popular values and attitudes, and display their own logic of political development (Sartori, 1969). Moreover, during the early stages of the development of political parties, the supply side of the political market decisively affects the demand side, not vice versa (see Rokkan, 1977). In other words, political actors and political institutions, or humanly devised “rules of the game,” shape the direction of mass preferences and determine the dynamics of the political regime and of oppositions. This does not, of course, mean that mass preferences do not matter at all, but, realistically, the masses matter in politics only as much and for as long as political elites permit (or do not permit) them to do so. (pg. 227)
Gelman also explicates how a progressive, democratic opposition is constrained in their efforts in a way authoritarians and extremists are not:
Segments of the opposition were unable to find a solution of the “classical problem of any opposition … how much to oppose and by what means. If the opposition does not oppose—does not present alternatives and struggle energetically for them—then the representative powers of political institutions—their capacity to mobilize and incorporate—is weak.… But if the opposition does oppose vigorously, democracy may be threatened” (Przeworski, 1991, p. 89). The problem affects not only the ideological and organizational development of opposition parties, but also their political strategies. According to the well-known typology of reactions to crises elaborated by Albert O. Hirschman, the choice of opposition strategies lies between “exit,”“voice,” and “loyalty” (Hirschman, 1970), represented, respectively, in the form of doing “petty things,” (i.e., oppositional activities without serious challenge to the status quo), mass mobilization (mainly electoral), and bargaining with the ruling group and consequent cooptation (“implementation into power”)
Recalling the work of Javier Corrales, and the notion of ‘autocratic legalism’ cited above— progressive opponents of an authoritarian or overtly fascist regime rely on democratic institutions, the rule of law, protected means of expression, and non-violent means to attempt to oust the autocratic leader; the autocratic regime operates under no such restraints: they can use all mechanisms of control and power— the legislature, courts, security agencies, media, under the guise of legality, or through blatantly illegal and violent means. The contest between the autocratic regime and progressive opposition is always asymmetrical.
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Elements of Opposition and Resistance
I’ve painted a bleak picture, here and abroad, for progressive democracy, because the situation is bleak. American constitutional democracy isn’t dead, but it’s not well, and the people that want to withdraw its life support— the fascist autocrats of the GOP— are about to assume control of all three branches of the federal government, and maintain a hold on a majority of the states.
We must accept that the GOP is not interested in sustaining democratic principles, or the rule of law, other than as a facade, or a justification for extremist actions (the First, Second, Fourth and Fifth Amendments apply to the Tea Party and right-wing militia, but not BLM, for example). The popular vote only matters in those elections they win it, ignored, subverted, or suppressed in all other instances. They do not operate in good faith, or pursue mutual interests or reasonable compromise. President Obama approached the GOP as if they did, and was declared illegitimate from the first to the last day of his presidency. Conservatives across the country (including state officials) plainly stated that they could ignore any part of federal law and authority they chose (e.g., Alabama supreme court chief justice Roy Moore, and the Bundy criminal cabal, openly supported by members of congress while trespassing on federal land, evading taxes, and threatening federal agents with violence).
We no longer have the luxury of appealing to conservatives and the GOP as ‘fellow Americans who just want the same things for the country we all do’. GOP voters and officials are either fully aligned with fascist autocracy, or they are willing dupes. Those that aren’t willing dupes have left the party. Don’t be too quick to allow a GOP voter to claim they didn’t see or fully support all of the GOP’s program (there were no shortage of Germans and Italians after WWII who took refuge in their claimed ignorance or ‘less than full support’ of policies).
*1. The GOP must not be viewed or treated, at any level, as legitimate in their exercise of political authority, or that they intend to abide by any of the norms of civil society. Engage with them as if they do legitimizes them, and will be rewarded only with efforts to maximize their own power, and strip anyone not a party loyalist of civil liberties. Waiting for ‘more evidence’ than we’ve already seen, or hoping for ‘good, decent, reasonable’ conservatives to wake up is what got us here. It failed. We cannot afford another month, year or decade of similar failures to oppose them.
*2. We must see ourselves as we have viewed opposition groups around the world— the ones we support in principle, if not in practice, in China, Russia, Iran, or Saudi Arabia. They are us. We need their support and recognition as an opposition movement as much as we need theirs. Direct contact, strategic alliance.
*3. The primary means of fighting authoritarian regimes are speech, protest, refusal to comply with directives, and boycotts.
a) speech and protest are self-explanatory, although it is useful to look to examples. One example is ‘The Mothers of the Disappeared’ in Pinochet’s Argentina (see Colleen McCormack, The Madres de Plaza de Mayo: Motherhood's Search For Answers During The Dirty War In Argentina.)
b) refusal to comply with directives means active resistance to the policies, programs and enforcement efforts of the GOP that further the goals of the fascist autocracy. A description of various instances of successful resistance through active non-compliance is found in Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict :
Nonviolent resistance is a civilian-based method used to wage conflict through social, psychological, economic, and political means without the threat or use of violence. It includes acts of omission, acts of commission, or a combination of both.9 Scholars have identified hundreds of nonviolent methods—including symbolic protests, economic boycotts, labor strikes, political and social noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention—that groups have used to mobilize publics to oppose or support different policies, to delegitimize adversaries, and to remove or restrict adversaries’ sources of power.10 Nonviolent struggle takes place outside traditional political channels, making it distinct from other nonviolent political processes such as lobbying, electioneering, and legislating. (pg.9)
First, although there is no blueprint for success, nonviolent campaigns that meet the criteria identified above are more likely to succeed than violent campaigns with similar characteristics. Second, targeted forms of external support were useful in the East Timorese and Philippines cases. Although there is no evidence that mass nonviolent mobilization can be successfully begun or sustained by external actors, organized solidarity groups that maintained steady pressure on governments allied with the target regimes were helpful, suggesting that international groups can enhance the campaign’s leverage over the target.115 External assistance, however, may be counterproductive if, by association, it hurts the credibility of a movement. Third, given the critical role played by the media in facilitating backfire, supporting the creation and maintenance of independent sources of media and technology that allow nonviolent actors to communicate internally and externally is another way that governmental and nongovernmental actors can support nonviolent campaigns. Fourth, technical capacity-building in elections monitoring and human rights documentation are other useful tools for nonviolent activists. Fifth, the provision of educational materials (e.g., books, films, DVDs, and videogames) that highlight lessons learned from other historical nonviolent movements has been cited by nonviolent activists as critical to their mobilization.116 (pg. 43, emphasis added)
c) boycotts, both locally, nationally and enlisting international allies (including governments and NGOs); an analysis of effective boycott strategies is found in an article by Brayden King, The Tactical Disruptiveness of Social Movements: Sources of Market and Mediated Disruption in Corporate Boycotts:
Boycotts may be an especially attractive tactic for anticorporate activists precisely because companies have come to rely so extensively on image and reputation to build value; however, this mechanism of influence—mediated disruption—has not been the traditional purpose of boycott. For example, the civil rights movement famously used boycotts to disrupt the sales revenue of Southern businesses, eventually forcing them to become racially integrated (Luders 2006). The increasing importance of reputation and positive media coverage appears to have changed the mechanism of a boycott’s greatest influence, thus making it an attractive tactic for movements of all types. By demonstrating the effect of mediated disruption on market disruption, the study shows how the media is an important link between a movement, the target, and the public. Although these findings are most generalizable to movements targeting corporations, other movement scholars have suggested the media may be equally influential in shaping movements’ impact on state policy making and implementation. (pg. 512)
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Additional resources for resistance:
The Albert Einstein Institution, 198 Methods of Non-Violent Action
The American Friends Service Committee, Boycott! The Art of Economic Activism.
Green America, Boycott Organizer’s Guide
James Jasper, A Strategic Approach To Collective Action: Looking for Agency In Social-Movement Choices
Cult of Pedagogy, A Collection of Resources for Teaching Social Justice
The Freechild Project, Social Justice Links